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Collapse of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue: Punching Shear
Case Study
Suzanne King, S.M.ASCE,1 and Norbert J. Delatte, M.ASCE2
Abstract: On January 25, 1971, two thirds of a 16-story apartment building collapsed while under construction at 2000 Commonwealth
Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts. Four workers died after a failure on the roof instigated a progressive collapse all the way to the basement,
where the men were found. Fortunately, the collapse occurred slowly enough for most of the other workers to run to safety. An
investigation, conducted by a commission assembled by the Mayor of Boston, painted a picture of a troubled project, with considerable
confusion about responsibility for structural safety. The surviving workers’ descriptions of the failure provide a textbook deﬁnition of
punching shear. Low concrete strength due to inadequate protection against cold weather contributed to low punching shear strength of the
ﬂat slab. Inspection, quality control, planning, and supervision were for all practical purposes absent from the project. This paper
investigates the numerous causes and lessons learned of this structural failure. Two similar cases are also reviewed.

CE Database subject headings: Collapse; Buildings, residential; Massachusetts; Boston; Structural failure; Case reports.

Introduction
Four workers died when about two-thirds of a 16-story apartment
building under construction collapsed on January 25, 1971. The
next day’s Boston Globe newspaper featured dramatic photo
graphs of the remains of the collapsed structure. Two of the pho
tographs accompanying the article are shown as Figs. 1 and 2.
Rescue operations were delayed because of concerns about the
stability of the remaining structure (Blake 1971). Nearly 71.6 MN
(8,000 t) of debris were removed before the bodies of the workers
could be recovered (Granger et al. 1971). A building that had
been in development for over 6 years collapsed in a few minutes.
Fortunately, the collapse occurred slowly enough that most of the
men working on the site were able to escape.
Punching shear was believed to have triggered the collapse.
An investigation called for by the mayor found that there had
been many errors and omissions associated with the apartment
building. Over the long period of development, there had been
many changes in the building’s owners and designers, leading to
considerable confusion (Granger et al. 1971). Some of the key
events are listed in Table 1. It is difﬁcult to trace the project
ownership and to determine who was responsible for the safety
and structural integrity of the project.

Design and Construction
The building was a cast-in-place reinforced concrete ﬂat slab con
struction with a central elevator shaft core. This style of construc
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tion is popular for multistory buildings because it reduces the slab
thickness and the overall height of the building (Feld and Carper
1997). The ﬂat slabs were 190 mm (7 1/2 in.) thick, except for
some bays near the elevator core and at stairwells, which were
230 mm (9 in.) thick. This made possible a story height of 2.7 m
(9 ft) for most of the ﬂoors.
The building at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue was designed to
be 16 stories high with a mechanical room above a 1.5-m (5-ft)
crawl space on the roof. The building was 55.1 by 20.9 m (180 ft
10 in. by 68 ft 6 in.) in plan. The ﬂoor plan is shown in Fig. 3.
The structure also had two levels of underground parking. A
swimming pool, ancillary spaces, and one apartment were located
on the ﬁrst ﬂoor and 132 apartments were on the second through
sixteenth ﬂoors. Originally these apartments were to be rented,
but the owners later decided to market them as condominiums
(Granger et al. 1971).
Construction began on the site late in the fall of 1969. Nearly
all of the work was subcontracted. Only one representative from
the general contractor was on site during construction.
At the time of collapse, construction was nearing completion.
Brickwork was completed up to the sixteenth ﬂoor and the build
ing was mostly enclosed from the second to ﬁfteenth ﬂoors.
Plumbing, heating, and ventilating systems were being installed
throughout various parts of the building. Work on interior apart
ment walls had also started on the lower ﬂoors. A temporary
construction elevator was located at the south edge of the building
to aid in transporting equipment to the different ﬂoors. It is esti
mated that 100 men were working in or around the building at the
time of failure (Granger et al. 1971).

Collapse
After interviewing many eyewitnesses, the mayor’s investigating
commission concluded that the failure took place in three phases.
These phases were (1) punching shear failure in the main roof at
column E5; (2) collapse of the roof slab; and (3) the progressive
and general collapse of most of the structure (Granger et al.
1971).

Fig. 1. Chunks of concrete and wood were strewn across MBTA track (in foreground) by building collapse [from Boston Globe, January 26,
1971; republished with permission]

Phase 1: Punching Shear Failure in the Main Roof
at Column E5
At about 10 in the morning on the 25th of January, 1971, concrete
was being placed in the mechanical room ﬂoor slab, wall, wall
beams, and brackets. Placement started at the west edge and pro
ceeded east. Later in the afternoon, at about 3 o’clock, most of the
workers went down to the south side roof for a coffee break. Only
two concrete ﬁnishers, Mr. D. N. and Mr. J. O., remained on the
pouring level.
Shortly after the coffee break, the two men felt a drop in the
mechanical room ﬂoor of about 25 mm (1 in.) at ﬁrst and then
another 50–75 mm (2 or 3 in.) a few seconds later. The labor
foreman, Mr. A. P., was directing the crane carrying the next
bucket of concrete. He instructed the operator to ‘‘hold the
bucket’’ and went down to the sixteenth ﬂoor by way of a ladder
in the east stairway. That is when he noticed the punching shear
around column E5. He stated: ‘‘I can’t believe my eyes. I see this
slab coming down around the column.’’ (Granger et al. 1971, p.
13).
The carpenter foreman, Mr. A. F., was also in the area and
immediately yelled a warning to the men working on the six
teenth ﬂoor and roof of a possible roof collapse. The slab had
dropped 125–150 mm (5 or 6 in.) around the column, and there
was a crack in the bottom of the slab extending from column E5
toward column D8. Column E5 is located directly below where
the concrete was being placed for the mechanical room ﬂoor slab
on the east side of the building, as shown in Fig. 3 (Granger et al.
1971).

Phase 2: Collapse of the Roof Slab
After hearing Mr. A. F.’s warning, most of the workers in the area
of column E5 managed to run to an east balcony and stay there
until after the roof slab collapse. Eyewitness testimony concluded
that the collapse happened fairly quickly. The roof slab began to
sag in the shape of a belly and reinforcing steel began popping
out from the mechanical room ﬂoor slab. The structure started to

shake and the east half of the roof slab collapsed onto the six
teenth ﬂoor. Then it stopped, giving the workers a chance to run
down the stairs to the ground.
At the time of failure, the structural subcontractor was placing
reinforcing steel for the stairs on the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth
ﬂoors on the east side of the building. When the workers were
making their way from the roof and ﬂoors above, most of them
crossed over to the west side of the building when they reached
the ﬁfteenth ﬂoor (Granger et al. 1971). Thus, the portion of the
building that remained standing, shown on the right side of Fig. 1,
provided an escape for many of the workers that survived.

Phase 3: General Collapse
After the roof collapsed, the roof settled and most of the stranded
workers could be rescued using the crane and construction eleva
tor. However, about 10–20 min after the roof failed, the east side
of the structure began to collapse. A resident of 1959 Common
wealth Avenue described the collapse as a domino effect (or pro
gressive collapse). The weight of the collapsed roof caused the
sixteenth ﬂoor to collapse onto the ﬁfteenth ﬂoor, which then
collapsed on the fourteenth ﬂoor, and so on to the ground (Litle
1972).
At ﬁrst the different ﬂoors were distinguishable, but later dust
and debris made it difﬁcult to tell them apart. When the dust
ﬁnally settled, two-thirds of the building had collapsed. The east
side and areas on either side of the elevator shaft were gone. Four
workers were killed during the collapse, and 30 workers suffered
injuries (Granger et al. 1971). The extent of damage is shown in
Fig. 4. The elevator core probably prevented the collapse from
propagating to the other half of the structure.

Commission Investigation
A commission of inquiry was selected by the mayor of Boston
and convened a week after the collapse. The Associated General
Contractors of Massachusetts, the Boston Society of Architects,

Fig. 2. Building collapse; four men missing and three injured when
apartment under construction collapsed in Brighton [from Boston
Globe, January 26, 1971; republished with permission]

the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, and the Boston Building
and Construction Trades Council had representatives on the com
mission. Professor William A. Litle of the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology helped draft the commission report and later re
ported on the failure (Litle 1972).
The commission retained an engineering ﬁrm and a testing
laboratory to aid in the investigation. The commission inter
viewed a number of eyewitnesses, but suspended the interviews
after about a dozen because there was no signiﬁcant disagreement
between the accounts (Granger et al. 1971).
The commission made a number of important ﬁndings:
• There were a number of irregularities in the issuance of the
building permit. Key drawings were missing. Not a single
drawing found in the ﬁle carried an architect’s or engineer’s
registration stamp. The structural engineer refused to provide
the calculations supporting his design to the commission. No
principal or employee of the general contractor held a Boston
builder’s license. At the time, partial drawings could be used to
obtain a building permit, with the understanding that ﬁnal
stamped drawings would have to be supplied before construc
tion could begin.

• Ownership of the project changed a number of times, with
changes in architects and engineers. This added to the overall
confusion and contributed to the irregularities cited previously.
Some of the key changes are outlined in Table 1.
• The general contractor only had a single employee on site, and
most subcontracts were issued directly by the owner to the
subcontractors and bypassed the general contractor. At least
seven subcontractors were involved.
• The structural concrete subcontract did not require any inspec
tion or cold weather protection of the work, although the de
signer had speciﬁed these measures. There was no evidence of
any inspection of the work by an architect or engineer, al
though the project speciﬁcations required this.
• The concrete mix designs were not prequaliﬁed. Such
prequaliﬁcation was a Boston Building Code requirement and
stipulated that the performance of the proposed concrete be
veriﬁed by laboratory testing. Some concrete deliveries did not
contain the required air entrainment. Calcium chloride was
used as an accelerator for some of the concrete, although it
was speciﬁcally prohibited by the designer’s speciﬁcations.
The designer’s speciﬁcations included a water-reducing ad
mixture, which was used in only a small percentage of the
concrete supplied. The Boston Building Code requirements for
inspection and testing were not met on 65% of the days con
crete was delivered to the project. Chemical analyses also sug
gested that some samples had low cement content.
• The triggering mechanism of the collapse was punching shear
at the roof slab around column E5, probably preceded by ﬂex
ural yielding of the roof slab adjacent to the east face of the
elevator core.
The commission examined the failure from three aspects:
• Whether failure would have been expected if the construction
had conformed to the design documents;
• Whether the construction procedures and materials conformed
to the design documents; and
• Whether the design documents met the building code require
ments.
The commission concluded that the failure would not have
occurred if the construction had conformed to design documents,
and that the construction procedures and materials were deﬁcient.
The most signiﬁcant deﬁciencies were a lack of shoring under the
roof slab and low strength concrete. The design documents speci
ﬁed a 28-day strength of 20 MPa (3,000 psi). At the time of the
failure, 47 days after casting, the concrete had yet to achieve the
28-day strength.
There was some confusion as to whether the concrete at the
point of the collapse had been cast on December 3 or 9, 1970.
Both concrete placements had deﬁcient strength, with 11 and 13
MPa (1,600 and 1,900 psi) at 47 and 53 days, respectively. The
commission believed that these two factors, lack of shoring and
low concrete strength, were the principal cause of the collapse.
However, the commission also found that the design did not
meet code requirements for the slab thickness at column E5. The
minimum thickness requirement was governed by deﬂection and
not by strength, but a thicker slab would have provided a greater
safety margin against punching shear (Granger et al. 1971).
Although the structural plans limited construction loading to
1.44 kPa (30 psf), actual loads were estimated to approach 6.22
kPa (130 psf). Some boilers and construction equipment were
stored on the roof at the location where the failure began. The
locations of shores were speciﬁed on the structural plans, but
these requirements were ignored (Granger et al. 1971). Witnesses
reported that there were few shores.

Table 1. Event Table for Construction of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue Apartment Building
Date
November 3, 1964

May 24, 1965
August 16, 1967
November 20, 1967

July 3, 1968
December 23, 1968
July 7, 1969

August 1, 1969
August 27, 1969

August 29, 1969
September 4, 1969
September 5, 1969
Fall 1969
Fall 1969 to 1970
November 10, 1970
January 25, 1971

Action
First building permit application was ﬁled for a seven-story, 89 apartment building. B.C. is listed as owner
and S. E. is listed as architect. Permit was ﬁrst refused because building exceeded allowable building height.
A later appeal granted the permit on December 24, 1964.
Letter ﬁled by W. L. of La Mont Corporation stated that construction of the building had started. Records show
excavation was started and the lot was fenced.
Notice was given to B. C. by the building department that his permit had lapsed due to unreasonable delay
in completing the building.
B. C. ﬁled a new building permit for a 14-story, 85 apartment luxury building, naming G. G. architect.
However, the permit was not signed by ‘‘the person who is to perform or take charge of the work covered
by the permit’’ as speciﬁed by codes. Therefore, the permit was not issued. The application was then deemed
abandoned because there was no permit issued within 6 months of application.
A zoning change for the property was obtained by H. K.
W. F. of Toronto, Canada; M. F. and T. H., both of Montreal, Canada; and A. H., B. C., H. K., S. R., and L. P., all
of Massachusetts, are named owners of the property at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue.
A permit was issued for a 16-story reinforced-concrete building designed by the architectural ﬁrm of W, Z, and M
of West Toronto, Canada. However, Massachusetts state laws require permits to bear the seal of a registered architect
or registered professional engineer from Massachusetts and the architectural ﬁrm of W, Z, and M does not have any
principal or employees in Massachusetts.
An excavation permit is issued to B. C. as the authorized agent for the owner and T. Construction Co. as contractor.
Another building permit is applied for, this time naming J. P. as owner or authorized agent and T. Construction, Inc.,
as contractor. Also, the signature of D. M. of Cochituate, Mass., appeared in the space for the signature of a licensed
builder. It is later revealed that D. M. was not a licensed builder at the time.
A sworn afﬁdavit states that the structural plans, drawn by M. S. Y. and Associates, were in accordance
with the Building Codes of the City of Boston.
There is a change of ownership. Two of the previous owners drop out and three more join the existing owners,
called the 2000 Commonwealth Associates.
The building permit is granted. However, the mayor’s commission’s report describes many irregularities and
discrepancies-with this permit.
Construction begins on 16-story apartment building.
Concept of building is changed. The owners will now sell the apartments as condominiums. A brochure is made,
but no units are sold.
Ownership changes yet again. This time M. A., B. C., and L. W. are made trustees of the 2000 Commonwealth
Association Trust.
Building collapses.

The commission also noted a number of deﬁciencies and de
viations with reinforcement placement. These included (Granger
et al. 1971):
• Omission of column ties in the bottom 1 m (39 in.) or so of
several columns;
• Concrete cover for vertical column bars varying between 13

and 200 mm (1/2 and 8 in.) instead of the speciﬁed 48 mm (1
7/8 in.).
• One collapsed column had only six instead of eight 19 mm
(3/4 in., U.S. #6) longitudinal reinforcing bars, with similar
discrepancies in other columns.
• East-west top slab steel was speciﬁed to be four 40.8 mm bars

Fig. 3. Floor plan and location of column E5 [after Granger et al. (1971)] (1 ft=0.3 m)

Fig. 4. Extent of collapse [after Granger et al. (1971)] (1 ft=0.3 m)

(3/4 in., U.S. #6) and ﬁve 13 mm (1/2 in., U.S. #4). None of
the larger bars were found, and the smaller bars were used
consistently in place of the larger bars.
• The vertical position of the slab reinforcement was erratic. In
some cases, the top steel was at or below the middepth of the
slab.
• The collapse occurred near a construction joint, and the struc
tural plans speciﬁed additional steel dowels across such joints.
The witness testimony indicated that these dowels were not
placed.

Punching Shear Mechanism
Punching shear is usually the critical failure mechanism for ﬂat
slab reinforced concrete structures. This mechanism is illustrated
in Fig. 5. With this type of failure, the column and part of the slab
punch through the slab as it moves downward.
The force acting on the slab around a column overcomes the
resistance and the slab falls down around the column. A portion of
the slab is left around the column, but the remainder of the slab
falls to the next ﬂoor. If the lower slab is unable to hold up both
ﬂoors, then a progressive collapse will begin.
Also, punching shear redistributes forces acting on the failed
slab to other columns. If the other columns cannot carry the added

weight, then the slab will start punching through the surrounding
columns as well. Punching shear at one column can initiate a
complete failure of a building.
The punching shear strength of a ﬂat slab (without shear rein
forcement) depends on ﬁve factors (Ghosh et al. 1995):
1. Concrete strength,
2. Relationship of size of loaded area to slab thickness,
3. Shape of loaded area,
4. Shape of perimeter area, and
5. Ratio of shear force to moment at slab-column connection.
The punching shear strength V c of a ﬂat slab, for a simpliﬁed
case of an interior column, may be expressed in U.S. customary
units as (Ghosh et al. 1995):
V c =4 . f ;c b 0 d

(1)

where f ;c =28-day cylinder compressive strength of the concrete;
d=depth of the slab (measured from the bottom of the slab to the
reinforcing steel location); and b 0 =perimeter of the failure sur
face around the column measured at distance d from the face of
the column. For SI units the constant, 4, changes, but the relation
ships between the variables remain the same.
Therefore, the punching shear strength of a ﬂat slab depends
on concrete strength and slab depth. Punching shear strength var
ies as the square root of the concrete strength. The effect of slab

Fig. 5. Punching shear mechanism

thickness is more than linear, because increasing d also increases
b 0 slightly. The lower concrete test strengths cited previously
would lead to a punching shear capacity reduction of 20–27%.
The low placement of top steel bars in the slabs would lead to an
even greater reduction of punching shear capacity.

Review of Causes of Failure
A week after the collapse, Engineering News Record reported that
there were three possible causes of structural failure under inves
tigation: (1) formwork for the penthouse ﬂoor slab collapsing
onto the roof; (2) a heavy piece of equipment falling from a crane
and starting the progressive collapse; or (3) failure of weak con
crete placed during previous cold days (‘‘Cause’’ 1971). After an
extensive investigation, the mayor’s commission concluded that
there were many ﬂaws that contributed to the collapse.
The committee determined that punching shear failure at col
umn E5 triggered the initial collapse. The major areas of con
struction that did not follow the design were shoring and concrete
strength. Inadequate shoring under the roof slab on the east side
of the building made it impossible for the roof to hold the freshly
placed concrete for the mechanical room ﬂoor slab, the construc
tion equipment, and the two boilers that were stored on that side
of the building. Also, the concrete strength of the roof slab was
well below the 20 MPa (3,000 psi) speciﬁed in the design
(Granger et al. 1971).
Deﬁcient concrete strength could be attributed to poor quality
concrete, improper curing, or both. Tests indicated that the
amount of cement in the concrete was sufﬁcient, but records sug
gested that the maximum permissible slumps were consistently
exceeded. The slump speciﬁcation was only met in 37 of 240
tests. This could indicate too much water, leading to lower
strength concrete.
Also, testimony indicated that the speciﬁcations for concrete
protection in cold weather were not followed. Average curing
temperature from the day of placement until the day of collapse
was -4°C (25°F). The concrete was not protected against the
effects of cold weather. The commission believed that poor curing
seriously retarded concrete strength gain (Granger et al. 1971).
The commission also found that the reinforcing steel details
did not provide for sufﬁcient steel crossing columns or for sufﬁ
cient development length. One important detailing error was that
the bottom slab bars were not long enough to tie into the core
walls. Furthermore, signiﬁcant differences were found between
the structural drawings and the location and amount of steel in the
parts of the building that were recovered. In some locations, as
little as one-half of the speciﬁed top slab steel was actually
placed. There were no ties in column splice regions. Although
these errors did not contribute to the initiation of the collapse,
they probably inﬂuenced the speed and extent of the propagation
of the failure (Granger et al. 1971).

Design and Detailing Concerns
The design and detailing concerns that contributed to the collapse
include insufﬁcient length and placement of rebar and various
structural design deﬁciencies. The steel was delivered by the sup
plier in bundles with marks on the steel indicating the intended
use and location in the structure. However, some of the marks
used were the same as the marks on the design plans, yet had a
different meaning.

For example, the supplier gave marks for bars at the south
edge of the slab that were identical to marks given on the engi
neer’s drawings for top slab bars over column E5. The commis
sion was unable to determine what procedures were used to actu
ally select and place the reinforcement, and how confusion in the
ﬁeld with regard to the bar markings may have contributed to the
collapse (Granger et al. 1971).
There were also detailing errors in the reinforcement. Some of
the bars were not long enough to provide adequate development
into the columns and walls as required by code, and placement of
bars in some of the slabs was not sufﬁcient to meet the American
Concrete Institute’s (ACI) code at the time. ACI required that at
least 25% of the negative slab reinforcement in each column strip
pass over the column within a distance of ‘‘d’’ on either side of
the column face (Granger et al. 1971). This requirement was not
fulﬁlled.
The Commission found that the slab should have been 222
mm (8 3/4 in.) thick to satisfy the ACI 318-63 (ACI 1963) code
requirements. However, this limit is based on deﬂection, and not
on strength (Granger et al. 1971). It should be emphasized that
there were no indications of inadequate design. Rather, the build
ers failed to adhere to the plans and speciﬁcations, and the owner
failed to provide for proper inspection of the work.

Procedural Concerns
There were many procedural concerns in the construction of 2000
Commonwealth Avenue. For all practical purposes, there was no
supervision of the construction. Nearly every step of construction
was ﬂawed (Kaminetzky 1991). Some of the major concerns in
clude lack of proper building permit and ﬁeld inspection, prema
ture removal of formwork, and lack of construction control.
The investigating committee determined that if the construc
tion had had a proper building permit and had followed codes
then the failure could have been avoided. Since there were nu
merous problems that all played a part in the collapse, deciding
whom to hold responsible for the collapse became difﬁcult. Own
ership changed hands many times, and most jobs were subcon
tracted. Some of the transactions that took place with Boston’s
Building Department are listed in Table 1 (Granger et al. 1971).
There was confusion surrounding the project from the start.
Construction did not follow the structural engineer’s speciﬁ
cations for shoring or formwork. Before removal of shores and
forms, the concrete must ﬁrst reach 70% of its designated 28 day
strength in order to meet that speciﬁcation. It was the commis
sion’s opinion that, despite 7 day cylinder tests that said other
wise, the average strength of the concrete in the roof slab was
only 13 MPa (1,900 psi) after at least 47 days, not the required
14.5 MPa (2,100 psi) for removal or the speciﬁed 20 MPa (3,000
psi) required after 28 days. The reason for disregarding the tests
was the difference between the curing conditions in the laboratory
and at the project—the concrete on site would gain strength more
slowly in cold weather conditions, while laboratory specimens are
cured at a speciﬁed temperature and humidity. There was no in
spection or cylinder testing performed for the east side of the
building, so removal of formwork was based on values obtained
from the west side of the building. Furthermore, there was no
shoring under the roof slab below the freshly placed mechanical
room ﬂoor slab (Granger et al. 1971).
Finally, there was very little construction control on the site.
There was no architectural or engineering inspection of the
project, and the inspection done by the City of Boston was inad

equate. The design plans speciﬁcally stated that certain aspects of
the project needed to be approved by an architect, yet no architect
or engineer was consulted. Instead, construction was based on
arrangements made by the subcontractors. As mentioned before,
there was only one representative from the general contractor, and
this man was not a licensed builder. He did not direct, supervise,
or inspect any of the work done by the subcontractors (Granger
et al. 1971).

Similar Cases
The progressive collapse of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue was
similar to the later structural failures of buildings at Bailey’s
Crossroads and Harbour Cay. On March 2, 1973, the Skyline
Plaza in Bailey’s Crossroads, Virginia, collapsed while under con
struction. Like 2000 Commonwealth Avenue, premature removal
of shoring and insufﬁcient concrete strength were suggested as
the causes of failure. Low temperatures led to an estimated con
crete compressive strength of only 6.6 –9.9 MPa (960–1,440 psi)
at the time of the collapse. A National Bureau of Standards (NBS,
now National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST) in
vestigation team determined that punching shear failure at the
twenty-third ﬂoor caused a partial collapse that propagated to the
ground. Fourteen workers were killed and 34 were injured
(Carino et al. 1983).
The collapse of the ﬂat-plate Harbour Cay condominium
building in Cocoa Beach, Florida, on March 27, 1981, was caused
by a punching shear failure that triggered a progressive collapse,
much like 2000 Commonwealth Avenue and Skyline Plaza.
Eleven workers were killed and 23 were injured. An NBS inves
tigation team that included two individuals who had investigated
the Skyline Plaza collapse determined that the slab thickness of
203 mm (8 in.) did not meet the ACI code minimum of 279 mm
(11 in.). Also, the top reinforcing steel was placed too low, reduc
ing d from 160 mm (6.3 in.) to 135 mm (5.3 in.). As a result, the
calculated punching shear stresses exceeded capacity (Lew et al.
1982).
Investigations following the three collapses concluded that
both design and construction errors contributed to the cause of
collapse. All three failures could have been avoided if better in
spections of materials and construction details were conducted.
The papers by Lew et al. (1982) and Carino et al. (1983) and
other related documents were compiled by the American Concrete
Institute for a seminar in Avoiding Failures in Concrete Construction (ACI 1989). In fact, a punching shear failure in Indianapolis
was reported as early as 1911 (Feld 1978).

Lessons from This Case
The Bailey’s Crossroads and Harbour Cay collapses resulted in 25
deaths and 58 injuries combined (Lew et al. 1982; Carino et al.
1983). These could have been avoided if the engineers working in
Virginia and Florida had learned the lessons of the 2000 Com
monwealth Avenue collapse.
This case also illustrates the need for proper shoring of con
crete construction. Many failures over the years have occurred
due to insufﬁcient shoring or premature removal of shoring and
formwork.
Some of the causes of the failure and contributing factors are
summarized as follows:
• The owner did not provide competent involvement of design
professionals with knowledge of design and construction requirements.

• The contractor did not reshore the slab that failed.
• Concrete, possibly of poor quality, was not adequately pro
tected against cold weather.
• Low top bars in the slab led to inadequate slab depth.
• Construction loads on the roof slab were too high.
• There was no inspection by an architect or engineer, only poor
inspections by the City of Boston building inspector, and no
inspection by the general contractor’s representative (who was
not a licensed builder). The owner did not provide quality
control of the structural work, and the contractor did not com
ply with structural speciﬁcations.

Conclusions
Many lessons can be learned from the collapse of 2000 Common
wealth Avenue. The mayor’s investigating commission made rec
ommendations for improving the City of Boston’s Building
Codes. However, the commission also reported that, if the con
struction of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue had fully complied
with existing codes, then the collapse would not have occurred.
The commission was dismayed that the project could have pro
gressed through so many phases without the errors and omissions
being found and corrected.
The commission made recommendations to prevent similar
collapses in the future. These included changes in assigning re
sponsibility and ensuring competence of design, construction, and
inspection of major buildings, as well as additions to organization
and staff competence of the Building Department. At the time of
the failure, the Building Department had 130 employees but only
two registered professional engineers, and no registered architect.
In addition, changes in building codes to prevent propagation
of a local failure into a general collapse were recommended. In
order to facilitate these changes, the commission recommended
that the technical ﬁndings of the report be made generally avail
able. In the opinion of the writers, this has not been achieved—
the Commission’s report is not available for loan and must be
photocopied at the Boston Public Library.
Finally, this case and the cases of Bailey’s Crossroads and
Harbour Cay Condominium illustrate the importance and progres
sive nature of punching shear failure. This is a critical failure
mechanism for concrete structures of this type. Structural safety
depends on adequate slab thickness, proper placement of rein
forcement, and adequate concrete strength.
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Notation
The following symbols are used in this paper:
b 0 = perimeter of failure surface around column measured at
distance d from face;

d = depth of slab (measured from top or bottom of slab
to reinforcing steel location for positive and negative
moment, respectively);
f ;c = 28-day cylinder compressive strength of concrete;
and
V c = punching shear capacity of slab, units of force.
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